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STATE v. MANN: WHY RUFFIN?*
MARK TUSHNET**

Why did Thomas Ruffin write his opinion in State v. Mann as he
did and when he did? This Article argues that he did so to
establish himself as a judge who would fulfill the obligations of
an honorable Southerner to demonstrate courage and eloquence.
The opinion in Mann may also reflect some of the tensions
between proslavery ideology and the South's Christian
commitments, as well as ideas about the proper distribution of
authority over slavery's regulation between judges and juries as
representativesof the community.
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INTRODUCTION

Those who study State v. Mann' persistently ask three questions:
Why him? Why then? And why that? Take the final question first:
why does Judge Thomas Ruffin's opinion so strongly defend the
harshest imaginable account of the master's power over slaves? 2 The
answer that scholars tend to give is that Ruffin's opinion was correct
Copyright © 2009 by Mark Tushnet.
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Article
benefited from helpful comments made at a session of the Working Group on Slavery and
the Law convened by the Gilder-Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance,
and Abolition, Yale University.
1. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
2. The question is particularly pressing because no other Southern jurist appears to
have taken as strong a position, at least as early as Ruffin did. Ruffin's opinion attracted
the attention of Northern opponents of slavery such as Weld and Stowe. See HARRIET
BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP, at iv (Boston,
Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1856) (citing a decision by Judge Ruffin as a key plot device);
*

**

THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY As IT IS:

TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND

WITNESSES 60 (William Loren Katz ed., Arno Press, Inc. 1968) (1839) (discussing State v.

Mann).
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in the sense that it accurately described what the Southern slave
system required of the law in order for slavery to survive.3 That
response supports an answer to the first question, "Why Ruffin," as
well: Judge Ruffin was the one to write the opinion because he was
an especially talented judge, as indicated by Roscoe Pound's inclusion
of Ruffin on his short list of great American judges.4 The "When"
question is more difficult, but discussions of the decision center
around the possibility that Ruffin was aware of the then-recent slave
disturbances in Virginia, of which he might have learned from a
relative.5
In Part I, this Article posits that the "Why him" and "Why then"
questions should be answered in a somewhat simpler way that focuses
on Ruffin's biography but locates Ruffin within Southern society and
culture.6 Then, even more speculatively, this Article suggests in Part
II that the "Why that" question can be answered with reference to the
way Christianity simultaneously justified slavery to slave owners and
challenged them to avoid the sins that inevitably accompanied slave
ownership. By contrasting Mann with a decision Ruffin wrote a
decade later, Part III examines the role that Ruffin's understanding of
the judiciary played in the Mann opinion. The conclusion then builds
on the discussion of Christian morality to discuss briefly some of the
implications of the moralized terms in which today's historians deal
with State v. Mann.
I. STATE V. MANN AS PART OF RUFFIN'S BIOGRAPHY

Ruffin was just beginning his career on North Carolina's highest
court when he wrote State v. Mann.7 If one thinks of him as a
3. For my earlier discussions of State v. Mann, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND
INTEREST 54-65 (1981) [hereinafter Tushnet, AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY].
See
generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN

IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, SLAVE LAW] (discussing

State v. Mann's role in history and literature).
4. See Tushnet, SLAVE LAW, supra note 3, at 74-81 (discussing several of Ruffin's
other opinions and agreeing with Pound as to Ruffin's talent).
5. See id. at 73-74.
6. The information about Ruffin unearthed by Professor Eric Muller, in particular
about his involvement with the sales of slaves, provides additional support for the view
taken here that he was a man of his time, not exceptionally good or bad. See Eric L
Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. REV. 757, 778-97
(2009) (discussing Professor Muller's historical findings about Thomas Ruffin's personal

and professional life). This information does not, in my view, fundamentally change our
understanding of Ruffin.
7. Ruffin was born in 1787 and was in his early forties when he was elected by the
General Assembly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1829, the same year that
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"young" judge, one might profit from reflecting on the implications of
recent scholarship dealing with antebellum Southern views about
what young men should do.8 The short answer is that young menand so, perhaps, men starting new careers-should be ambitious and
courageous. 9 As Lorri Glover puts it, "if a boy wanted to
become
10
recognized as a man, he simply had to excel professionally.
Most often, it appears, "courage" referred to physical couragefearlessness in the face of physical danger, for example. But moral
courage counted as well. Moral courage consisted, in part, of
standing up for what was right, even in the face of potential
disapproval. Moral courage thereby converged with another desired
attribute-frankness in expression.1" When successful, performances
of moral courage could pretermit the disapproval that its authors
might have imagined would follow their action. The mere fact that a
performance of moral courage did not elicit disapproval would
support the claim that the author had indeed exhibited moral courage
in saying what he said. One might think, then, that it was courageous
to act when anticipating disapproval even if that disapproval never
materialized.
Jurists at the time were men whose words were their deeds. One
can see State v. Mann as demonstrating Ruffin's moral courage within
his slaveholding society. There he spoke truths that others, less
courageous because less willing to face up to slavery's true meaning,
could not-in particular, that slavery required the complete

Mann was decided. For biographical details, see William A. Graham, Thomas Ruffin, in
LIVES OF DISTINGUISHED NORTH CAROLINIANS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND SPEECHES

284-301 (Raleigh, North Carolina Publishing Society 1898) (discussing the biographical
details of Thomas Ruffin's life).
8. See generally PETER S. CARMICHAEL, THE LAST GENERATION:
YOUNG
VIRGINIANS IN PEACE, WAR AND REUNION (2005) (relying primarily on college essays as
the basis for a discussion of the views of Southern young men in the late antebellum
period); LORRI GLOVER, SOUTHERN SONS: BECOMING MEN IN THE NEW NATION
(2007) (relying primarily on letters from parents and sons as the basis for a discussion of
the education and character development of Southern young men during the early
Republic).
9. See ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE & EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE MIND OF THE
MASTER CLASS:
HISTORY AND FAITH IN THE SOUTHERN SLAVEHOLDERS'
WORLDVIEW 99-103 (2005) (discussing the complex of virtues associated with ambition in
the antebellum South); see also GLOVER, supra note 8, at 64 (asserting that college "boys
sought renown as independent, respected men, which they understood came from earning
the approval of their classmates").

10. GLOVER, supra note 8, at 149.
11. See Fox-GENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 101-02 (examining the

relationship between courage and frankness).
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domination of the master over the slave. 2 And, of course, precisely
for that reason, Ruffin's moral courage served his ambition as well. It
singled him out from other jurists who knew in their hearts that
Ruffin was right but could not bring themselves to say so as
forthrightly. Recognizing Ruffin's courage, they would celebrate him
and make him the leading jurist that he (it is assumed) aspired to be.
Ruffin's celebrated rhetoric of "reluctance" and compulsion served to
emphasize his courage: only men like him, his language suggested,
could face up to the necessities imposed by slavery on the legal
system. 3
Chivalry, which includes notions of courage, also played an
important part in Southern thought. 4 By extending courage to
encompass moral courage as well as physical courage, perhaps we can
understand additional elements in State v. Mann. As Ruffin's opinion
said, people like Mann were, after all, "barbarians," who were
regularly and increasingly condemned by their communities:
We are happy to see that there is daily less and less occasion for
the interposition of the Courts.

The ... frowns and deep

execrations of the community upon the barbarian who is guilty
of excessive and brutal cruelty to his unprotected slave ... have

produced a mildness of treatment, and attention to the comforts
of the unfortunate class of slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors
of servitude and ameliorating the condition of the slaves. 5
Mann was a moral weakling. The community surrounding himexemplified in part by the jurors who mistakenly convicted but
correctly condemned Mann-was courageous.
Yet, these answers to the "Why him?" and "Why then?"
questions may be unsatisfying because they contain an internal
tension. Physical courage could serve ambition because placing
oneself in physical danger means running a risk of physical harm.
12. In Ruffin's words, "The power of the master must be absolute to render the
submission of the slave perfect." State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
13. See id. at 263-64 ("With whatever reluctance therefore it is done, the Court is
compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the
slave in North Carolina."); see also id. at 268 ("I repeat that I would gladly have avoided
this ungrateful question. But being brought to it the Court is compelled to declare that
while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the
legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty
of the judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the
exercise of it is forbidden by statute.").
14. For an extensive discussion of chivalry in antebellum Southern thought, see FoxGENOVESE & GENOVESE, supranote 9, at 329-82.
15. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267-68.
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Being morally courageous in the sense I have sketched poses no risks,
or at least poses different ones. The only risk Ruffin's decision
exposed him to was the possibility that he would seem foolish rather
than morally courageous, which is only to say that he might have
discovered-though he did not-that being morally courageous was a
bad strategy for an ambitious jurist to adopt. Or, put another way,
"moral courage" is only metaphorically courageous and, for that
reason, might not lead to a person gaining the regard that physical
courage produced in antebellum Southern culture.
Other virtues were associated with chivalry, and so with physical
and moral courage. Describing his father, one Southerner recited
that he seemed "the gentlest, the tenderest, the most loving, the most
eloquent, the most earnest, the most fearless, the most impassioned,
or the fiercest man [a stranger] had ever met."' 6 Eloquent, fearless,
and fierce, but also gentle and tender-this was the slave owner at his
best. What would such a person do when confronted with another's
unjustified violence and brutality?
One would meet violence with violence when it was directed
against oneself, and sometimes even when it was directed against
others, such as women and children. That was the spontaneous
response, aimed at terminating on-going violence. Unjustified
violence against slaves was different, though, in part because it might
not occur in the chivalrous slave owner's immediate presence, 7 and in
part because the contours dividing the justified from the unjustified
were less clear. The proper response to brutality directed at slaves
was public disapproval. Fox-Genovese and Genovese support the
observation that "[l]eaders of public opinion did their best to uphold
the honor and reputation of the slaveholders and defend a social
system that taxed patience and ingenuity to the limit" by quoting a
statement made in 1846 by an Alabama agricultural society:
Your Committee feels well warranted in adding that the master
who could disregard all those motives for good treatment of
slaves, must be brutal indeed, and must be so obtuse in his
intellect as to act against the plainest principles of reason. For
such cases your Committee invokes the rigid enforcement of

16.

FOX-GENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 333-34.
17. When it did occur in the slave owner's presence, I suspect, the ideology of chivalry
would have the chivalrous slave owner intervene to stop the violence.
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the laws, and the expression of a strong condemnation by public
sentiment."
This "condemnation" is precisely Ruffin's point in State v. Mann.'9
State v. Mann, this Article suggests, can be seen as Ruffin's bid
for recognition as a leading jurist and intellectual. Mann is the work

of an ambitious man embarking on a career as a judge who
demonstrated moral courage in his work and located his legal ruling

within the larger framework of a Southern chivalric tradition-a
tradition that left disapproval of brutality against slaves to public

opinion rather than law. Another dimension of Southern thought,
though, might have countered this bid.
II. THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE BACKGROUND OF
MANN

Southerners were Christians too and had to reconcile the
violence associated with slavery and chivalry with their Christianity.
Their basic approach, this Article suggests, was threefold."

First,

violence directed at slaves was a sin associated with but not entailed
by slavery as such; second, a Christian master struggled against sin of
all sorts, including the sin of violence; and third, the sins associated

with slavery were not different in kind from any of the other sins to
which man was prone to commit."z The effect of this approach was to
normalize violence directed at slaves-that is, to shift it from the
domain of slavery to the domain of humankind generally.
By the 1820s, religious discourse around slavery had settled into

three forms. For some, the ownership of one person by another was
itself a sin committed by the owner. For others, slave ownership was
not itself sinful, but was a moral evil of a lesser degree.22

But,

18. See FOX-GENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 373 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 374-78 (discussing, in more detail, legal enforcement against and public
disapproval of brutality directed at slaves); GLOVER, supra note 8, at 83 ("[A] young
man's future hung on public perceptions.").
19. See Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263.
20. See generally Fox-GENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 505-27 (providing
an overview of the religion-related arguments that Southerners made in slavery's defense).
21. Later in the antebellum period the specific "comparator" for slavery as the locus
of sin became the Northern industrial factory: slavery provided no greater inducement to
sin than did Northern factory production. The classic expression can be found in
WILLIAM J. GRAYSON, The Hireling and the Slave, in THE HIRELING AND THE SLAVE,
CHICORA, AND OTHER POEMS 21 (Charleston, S.C., McCarter & Co. 1856). My sense is
that this argument was not well developed in 1829, but the comparison between slavery
and every other human institution obviously was available.
22. For a useful discussion of these alternatives, see generally RICHARD FULLER &
FRANCIS

WAYLAND,

DOMESTIC

SLAVERY

CONSIDERED

AS

A

SCRIPTURAL

2009]

WHY RUFFIN?

whether slavery was sin or mere moral evil, Christians ought to do
what they could to eliminate it. 23 The final form of discourse, of
course, was the slave owners': slavery was neither sinful nor in itself a
moral evil. 4 The phrase "in itself," though, was important. Slave
owners might believe that slaves were "a sacred trust to whom they
owed kindness and paternal care,, 25 and that slavery "created a bond
of interest that encouraged Christian behavior. '26 Yet, they knew
that people were not always trustworthy, and that encouragement
sometimes failed. A master who abused
his slaves did so "not simply
27
as a master, but as a wicked master.,
For slaveholders, power, not slavery itself, created the risk of sin:
Slaveholders protested that every social system suffered
unspeakable atrocities because men are frail creatures bound to
abuse power.... [I]f all social systems require concentration of
some men's power over others, and if the sinful nature of all
men tempts them to abuse it, then slavery, which especially
concentrates power, stands convicted as the least defensible of
human relations. 8
Concentrated power does indeed tempt people to abuse power, which
is why Ruffin was properly concerned that his legal interpretation
might be misunderstood as licensing abuse.29 Slave owners had to
achieve mastery over their slaves, and, in the course of doing so, by
using violence they might lose mastery over themselves. They needed
a "practiced domination,"3 but masters could easily slip into mere
domination. As Ruffin explained in his important opinion in State v.

INSTITUTION: IN A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE REV. RICHARD FULLER, OF
BEAUFORT, S.C., AND THE REV. FRANCIS WAYLAND, OF PROVIDENCE, R.I. (5th ed.,

New York, Lewis Colby & Co. 1847) (containing a series of correspondences between two
ministers who discussed and advocated these alternative viewpoints).
23. As one proslavery minister put it, "[i]f ... slavery be a sin, surely it is the
immediate duty of masters to abolish it." Id. at 3; see also FoX-GENOVESE & GENOVESE,
supra note 9, at 505 (quoting another proslavery minister: "If slavery be thus sinful, it
behooves all Christians who are involved in the sin, to repent in dust and ashes, and wash
their hands of it.").
24. See FoX-GENOVESE AND GENOVESE, supra note 9, at 515 (describing the

mentality that slavery was neither sinful nor a moral evil).
25. Id. at 237.
26. Id. at 368.
27. Id. at 621 (quoting Presbyterian theologian James Henry Thornwell).
28. Id. at 381.
29. That concern is implicit in Ruffin's paragraph expressing satisfaction that the
occasions for intervention against masters were decreasing. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2
Dev.) 263, 263-64 (1829).
30. GLOVER, supra note 8, at 178.
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Hoover,3 a decade after Mann, slave owners suffered the "infirmity
of our nature" and the possibility that they might be caught up in a
"brief fury" when they were punishing their slaves. 2 All men are
sinful, and slave owners had no reason to believe that the temptations
to sin occasioned by slavery were different from the temptations men
faced every day in every human institution.
This Article suggests that Christianity reinforced slavery by
treating the sins associated with slavery as indistinguishable from all
other sins. Misplaced violence was sinful whether it was directed at a
slave or at an unoffending passerby. And, of course, the honorable
slave owner would always be alert to threats to his honor, which
meant that misplaced violence-sin-in daily life was a real
possibility. Put another way, the power concentrated in the slave
owner's status did increase the likelihood that a slave owner would
abuse his slaves, but the honor associated with that status also
increased the likelihood of misplaced violence in daily life.
Christianity, understood in this way, normalized the sins associated
with slavery.
III. MANN AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE

State v. Mann was an opinion at least as much about the proper
role of judges in regulating a master's violence as it was about what
the overall law of slavery-statutory as well as judge-maderequired.33 Which institution-law, public opinion, or religion-was
best suited to regulate violence? Mann said that public opinion (and
34
religion) were better than law when mere assaults were involved.
Hoover said, in contrast, that the law had a role to play when violence
resulted in death:
A master may lawfully punish his slave; and the degree must, in
general, be left to his own judgment and humanity, and cannot
be judicially questioned. But the master's authority is not
altogether unlimited. He must not kill. There is, at the least,
this restriction upon his power: he must stop short of taking
life.35

31. 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 365 (1839).
32. Id. at 369 (emphasis in original).
33. For my discussion of this point, see Tushnet, AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, supra
note 3, at 901-21.
34. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 267-68 (1829).
35. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) at 368 (citing Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263
(1829)).
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There are, however, two anomalies here. First, Ruffin's opinion
in Mann never directly explains why the jury in a criminal case could
not be taken to express the community's condemnation of the
master's misconduct. Juries, that is, might have been taken as bodies
that instantiate public opinion within a legal framework. We might
read some sentences in Mann as an indirect explanation for Ruffin's
refusal to see the jury as the community's voice. Ruffin wrote:
The danger would be great, indeed, if the tribunals of justice
should be called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to
every temper and every dereliction of menial duty. No man can
anticipate the many and aggravated provocations of the master
which the slave would be constantly stimulated by his own
passions or the instigation of others to give.36

Consider the implications of these observations for criminal
prosecutions. An indictment would describe the circumstances under
which the defendant assaulted his slave. The defendant would say
that the circumstances described showed facially that his violence was
justified by the slave's provocation. The court would have to rule on
the legal question of whether, on the facts alleged, the master's
violence was indeed justified. Judges, that is, would screen cases out
of the legal system before they reached juries, which therefore could
not serve as the community's voice. But according to Ruffin, the
judicial screen would have to make impossible any jury consideration
of the master's conduct. Ruffin said: "The danger would be great,
indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the
punishment appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of
menial duty."37 Prosecutions for assaults were generally decided by
judges well before cases reached juries. In this view, then, the jury as
spokesperson for the community would play a smaller role than we
might think, smaller than the overall community's role had to be in
controlling masters' misconduct.
Second, as Professor Anthony Baker points out, Hoover sits
uneasily with Mann regarding the role of the judge in regulating
slavery.38 In Hoover, Ruffin expressed incredulity that the trial judge
had given an instruction-which the jury plainly found inapplicable
on the facts presented-dealing with the possibility that an assault
resulting in death might be manslaughter rather than murder "[i]f
36. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267.
37. Id.
38. See Anthony V. Baker, Slavery and Tushnet and Mann, Oh Why?: Finding "Big
Law" in Small Places,26 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 691,700-01 (2008).

976
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death unhappily ensue from the master's chastisement of his slave,
inflicted apparently with a good intent, for reformation or example,
and with no purpose to take life, or to put it in jeopardy."3 9 But,
Ruffin pointed out, the facts of the case showed "barbarities which
could only be prompted by a heart in which every humane feeling had
long been stifled."4
Still, as Professor Baker properly observes,
Ruffin's conclusion in Hoover does not really address the concerns
about legal regulation of the master-slave relation expressed in
Mann.4
The problem with the jury instruction is not with the truly brutal
master; it is with the master who worries that a jury might mistakenly
conclude that "moderate" chastisement that happened to result in
death was actually the product of a depraved heart. Nor is it
sufficient to say, as Ruffin seemed tempted to do in Hoover, that
judges could confine juries to the extreme cases through proper
instructions, for that point could have been made in Mann as well. In
Mann, Ruffin objected to even the most modest supervision of a
master's violence against his slaves as incompatible with slavery's
presuppositions
because
allowing such supervision would
communicate to slaves the erroneous message that they had someone
to appeal to other than the master.42 The same could be said of the
rule adopted in Hoover.4 3
Combine these observations with Ruffin's emphasis on the role
of public opinion in controlling a master's violence, and the claim that
his opinion demonstrates moral courage might weaken considerably.
Ruffin's opinion in Mann might exemplify moral courage, but to do
so Ruffin had to eliminate the possibility that any other judge would

39. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) at 368.
40. Id. Ruffin described the facts in these terms:
He beat her with clubs, iron chains, and other deadly weapons, time after time;

burnt her, inflicted stripes over and often with scourges, which literally excoriated
her whole body; forced her out to work in inclement seasons, without being duly
clad; provided for her insufficient food; exacted labour beyond her strength, and
wantonly beat her because she could not comply with his requisitions.

Id. at 369.
41. See Baker, supra note 38, at 698-701.
42. See Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 268 (recognizing the "full dominion of the owner
over the slave").
43. Jennifer Wahl suggested in comments on this Article that the difference between
Mann and Hoover might reside in the fact that assaults were likely to be common, yet
deaths (relatively) uncommon. Erroneous intrusions on the master-slave relation in
assault cases would therefore be more frequent than similarly erroneous intrusions in
murder cases, and the adverse effects on the institution of slavery would be smaller.
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ever be called upon to do the same. And Hoover might show that
Ruffin did not have the courage of his convictions.' Even more, what
is so courageous about deflecting responsibility for addressing the sins
to which all men are subject to one's neighbors? If there is any
answer, it must lie in the fact that Northern observers, at least,
commended Ruffin for his honesty and forthrightness 45 and that his
Southern colleagues might have overlooked the diffusion of
responsibility in his opinion.46
CONCLUSION

Ruffin's decisions in State v. Mann and other cases involving
slave law might raise not the hindsight defense that Professor Muller
discusses, 47 but what we might call foresight anxiety. Put aside
Ruffin's slave-law decisions and his other involvements with slavery,
and he would seem to be an extremely competent judge and a decent
human being-if not quite the exemplar of "The Chivalry," then
certainly a person who deserves the ordinary respect we give each
other.
What then do we make of Ruffin's blindness to the moral evil of
slavery? 41 Various answers suggest themselves, but I want to put
them aside and ask, what might Ruffin have thought of himself, and
what implications does that have for us? Surely Ruffin did not think
that his actions needed a defense of any sort, not even the hindsight
defense. As Professor Muller observes, criticisms of slavery as a
moral evil abounded in Ruffin's intellectual universe but did not sway
Ruffin, presumably because he found them mistaken.49 So too with
many of our practices-rarely does anyone believe that he or she has
committed himself or herself to defending and advancing evil. We
judge ourselves and others according to our own lights and treat those
who criticize us and our practices as mistaken.
44. Perhaps we might dissolve the tension between Mann and Hoover by invoking
psychology: Ruffin wrote Mann to establish his reputation, and once that had happened
he had no need to push Mann's reasoning further to the point where almost everyoneNorth and South-might have regarded him as morally obtuse.
45. See Tushnet, SLAVE LAW, supra note 3, at 52-55 (discussing the Abolitionist
response to Ruffin's opinion).
46. Perhaps, though, my reading here is a bit too Straussian, mistakenly divining a
concealed subtlety in Ruffin's opinion.
47. See generally Muller, supra note 6 (arguing that Ruffin was aware of, and
dismissed, critiques of slavery as a moral evil).
48. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
the evils associated with slavery and the evil of slavery itself).
49. See generally Muller, supra note 6 (discussing Ruffin's awareness and dismissal of
critiques of slavery).
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Ruffin shows us that people who regard themselves as basically
decent human beings can make deeply wrong judgments. Perhaps
By
that could induce in ourselves an appropriate humility.
condemning Ruffin for accepting and defending slavery, an
unquestionable moral evil, perhaps we prepare ourselves for a certain
self-satisfaction: no matter what you might say about some of our
practices, at least they are not as bad as slavery was.5" And yet, what
we today treat as normal and morally defensible may turn out in the
fullness of time to be quite evil. Perhaps even more disturbing, what
we treat today as evil and morally indefensible may turn out in the
fullness of time to be morally commendable.51 The foresight anxiety
is this: we cannot know-today-which of our judgments falls into
which category, and so perhaps we should be more temperate in our
judgments, perhaps even in our judgments of men like Ruffin.
Increased temperance and humility in our judgments does not
mean we must refrain from condemnation. The foresight anxiety
should not disable us from assessing the behavior of our predecessors
because in principle it applies as much to our contemporaries, and we
certainly do not want the foresight anxiety to bar us from honoring
those we admire today. So, we should use figures like Ruffin as
objects for thoughtful reflection on why and how people-in the past
and today-should be honored or repudiated.

50. This "defense" surfaced in discussion of whether waterboarding is torture, when
some who found themselves unable to condemn what the Bush administration had
authorized distinguishing the form of waterboarding U.S. employees used from the form
of water torture used during the Spanish Inquisition. For relevant material, see Posting of
Marty Lederman to Balkinzation, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/02/lowering-bar-well-atleast-were-not-as.html (Feb. 14, 2008, 17:51 EST).
51. I sometimes think of this as the "Sleeper" principle, after Woody Allen's film of
the same name. Allen is awakened after a two hundred year coma in the film and
discovers that many things thought bad for people in his time, such as fatty foods and
smoking, have since been shown to be quite good for people. So, for example, should we
worry that many people today eat cows, or that not enough people today eat cows?

